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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND 
NATURAL LAW: EMANATIONS  
WITHIN A PENUMBRA 
George P. Smith II* 
Michael W. Sweeney**
Abstract: In American jurisprudence, the public trust doctrine emerged 
as a means of protecting certain limited environmental interests, such as 
coastal waterways and ªshing areas, which were preserved for the bene-
ªt of the public and distinguished from grants of private ownership. 
However, modern scholars have called for an expansive application of 
the public trust doctrine, citing the growing inventory of “changing 
public needs” in the environmental context, such as the need for im-
proved air and water quality, and the conservation of natural landscape. 
This Article examines the history and scope of the public trust doctrine 
to determine how modern resource management ªts within the doc-
trine’s development under the Constitution and common law. Such an 
examination is incomplete without reviewing the important principles 
of Natural Law underlying the original doctrine. In the end, the Article 
concludes that modern trust expansion should be limited within the 
ancient values of principled economic reasoning. 
Introduction 
 Joseph Sax once commented, “Of all the concepts known to 
American law, only the public trust doctrine seems to have the 
breadth and substantive content which might make it useful as a tool 
of general application for citizens seeking to develop a comprehen-
sive legal approach to resource management problems.”1
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1 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Inter-
vention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471, 474 (1970). See generally Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea 
of the Public Trust, 25 Ecology L.Q. 351 (1998); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the 
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 For centuries, people have utilized some version of this doctrine 
by preserving portions of the environment for the greater public 
good, recognizing that the air, water, and seashores were “common to 
all by natural law.”2 This act of public preservation is administered by 
the state on behalf of its populace and seeks to protect natural re-
sources for the beneªt of the community at large. 
 Early American jurisprudence applied this concept to certain 
limited interests, such as coastal waterways and ªshing areas, which 
were preserved for the beneªt of the public and distinguished from 
grants of private ownership.3 This has been termed by some as the 
“classic list of protected [public] interests.”4 And yet, the doctrine has 
been cited in response to a growing inventory of “changing public 
needs” in the environmental context, such as the need for improved 
air and water quality, and the conservation of natural landscape.5
 Indeed, the Sax vision is a call to arms for environmentalists to 
utilize the public trust doctrine as a sword for greater judicial protec-
tion and a shield from property rights advocates.6 But, given the wide 
array of public interests and competing public rights, should the pub-
lic trust doctrine be used as such a vehicle for expansive environ-
mental protection? 
 This Article will examine the history and scope of the public trust 
doctrine to determine how Sax’s vision for resource management ªts 
                                                                                                                      
Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 Envtl. L. 
425, 426 & n.3 (1989) (citing Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1540, 1551–53 (1985)). 
2 Ralph W. Johnson, Water Pollution and the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 Envtl. L. 485, 491 
(1989) (citing J. Inst. 2.1.1). 
3 See Sax, supra note 1, at 475. 
4 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 495. 
5 See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971); Zachary C. Kleinsasser, Note, 
Public and Private Property Rights: Regulatory and Physical Takings and the Public Trust Doctrine, 
32 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 421, 433 (2005). One scholar notes that “[s]cholars and practi-
tioners have responded to Sax’s call and have advocated extending public trust protection 
to wildlife, parks, cemeteries, and even works of ªne art.” See Erin Ryan, Comment, Public 
Trust and Distrust: The Theoretical Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine for Natural Resource 
Management, 31 Envtl. L. 477, 480 (2001); see also Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 (“[A] use en-
compassed within the tidelands trust—is the preservation of those lands in their natural 
state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scientiªc study, as open space, and as 
environments which provide food and habitat for [nature] . . . .”). 
6 In particular, academic activists have heeded the call. See, e.g., David B. Hunter, An 
Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for Judicial Protection of the Public’s Interest in Environ-
mentally Critical Resources, 12 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 311, 378 (1988) (“A more desirable 
trend would be to switch the debate in public trust cases from a discussion of the doc-
trine’s historical roots to a discussion of the ecological values that should be protected in 
the public interest.”). 
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within the doctrine’s development under the Constitution and com-
mon law7—most notably, how does the inºuence of Natural Law re-
late to the function of the public trust doctrine. Once this historical 
assessment is complete, the Article will shift to an examination of 
modern public trust application in the environmental and land use 
arenas and test whether it should be used to expand its traditional 
coverage under the Natural Law perspective. Although the tenets of 
the Natural Law are penumbric, they nonetheless provide a founda-
tional bearing—or direction—for legitimizing the application of the 
public trust doctrine and, as the case may be, restraining its applica-
tion. In a very real way, then, this doctrine is an emanation within a 
penumbra, but one that is validated because of this very relationship. 
It can be correctly thought of as having a yin-yang—or positive-
negative—relationship with the Natural Law. Although this relation-
ship may also be seen as tenuous, it is far better than unbridled, sub-
jective judicial activism which has no guideposts at all for its voracious 
appetite. 
 The thesis of this Article is that rather than continuing to expand 
the broad reach of the public trust doctrine in the present design of a 
crazy patch-work quilt, its expansion should be both measured and 
restrained by the “common good.” Applying this standard—which 
seeks to balance the legitimate expectations and real interests of indi-
vidual property owners with the need for enhanced public resource 
preservation—will normally result in validating the legitimate eco-
nomic interests of the property owners. 
 The proposed balancing test is both informed and shaped by the 
Natural Law. A primary tenet of its recognition and protection of “indi-
vidual goods” or rights, such as property ownership, is measured 
against the “common good.”8 It is for the states to manage the direc-
tions that the public trust takes in modern society. In setting the 
framework for analysis of issues resolving trust expansion, the Natural 
Law template or test of reasoned balance can be a vade mecum or guide 
for both legislators and judges confronted by this challenging issue. 
                                                                                                                      
7 See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 426 n.6 (“The public trust doctrine derives from con-
stitutional, statutory, and common-law sources, and has been applied in various contexts to 
resources other than watercourses navigable for the purposes of title, including wildlife, 
federal public lands, and drinking water.”). 
8 Charles E. Rice, 50 Questions on the Natural Law: What It Is and Why We 
Need It 56 (1993). 
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I. Digging for the Ancient Roots of the Public Trust 
 As this Article ventures to examine the breadth of the public trust 
in American jurisprudence, it is important to investigate the doc-
trine’s historical underpinnings and the purposes which it serves.9 
The American rule of law regarding property rights and the public 
trust is premised upon an inherited line of reasoning from ancient 
Roman law and English common law.10
 Tracing the public trust concept back to its original roots, most 
scholars look to the Institutes of Justinian, a body of Roman civil law 
assembled in approximately 530 A.D.11 This text articulated the “nearly 
universal notion” that watercourses should be protected from complete 
private acquisition in order to preserve the lifelines of communal exis-
tence.12 Under a remarkable philosophy of natural resource preserva-
tion, the Romans implemented a concept of “common property” and 
extended public protection to the air, rivers, sea, and seashores, which 
were unsuited for private ownership and dedicated to the use of the 
general public.13 “[While] it remains unclear whether this represented 
true Roman practice or mere Justinian aspiration,” scholars believe the 
introduction of this public trust concept resonated throughout medie-
val Europe, inªltrating its common law system.14
 The English common law system, which directly inºuenced 
American thinking on the public trust, made practical use of these 
communal concepts.15 In particular, the English system provided a 
                                                                                                                      
9 As Justice Antonin Scalia points out, this is an important process with respect to any 
legal rule. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts on Interpreting the Constitution, in A Matter of Interpretation: Fed-
eral Courts and the Law 3, 7 (Amy Gutman ed., 1997). Understanding that a legal 
principle made in one case will be followed in another is “an absolute prerequisite to 
common-law lawmaking.” Id. 
10 See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 428–39. 
11 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 491–92, 491 n.26; Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 429. 
12 Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 430. 
13 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 491 (quoting Sax, supra note 1, at 475). Speciªcally, Byz-
antine law stated: “[b]y natural law, common to all these: the air, running water, the sea, 
and therefore the seashores.” J. Inst. 2.1.1–6 (Thomas trans.); see Ryan, supra note 5, at 
481. 
14 See Ryan, supra note 5, at 481. It is also important to realize that these concepts ex-
tended beyond the borders of Europe. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 429. In the Far East, the 
protection of water uses on behalf of the greater public was recognized before the birth of 
Christ. Id. Additionally, similar traditions were recognized in ancient Africa where people 
“enjoyed the right to ªsh the sea, with its creeks and arms and navigable rivers within the 
tides.” Id. (citing T.O. Elias, Nigerian Land Law 48 (1971)). In this respect, the concept 
of the public trust is internationally recognized. 
15 See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 430–31. 
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sensible framework that emphasized the need to balance community 
interests with private ownership rights.16 Consequently, English com-
mon law distinguished between property that was transferable to pri-
vate individuals, jus privatum, and property that was held in trust for 
the public, jus publicum.17
 In many respects, the English view of public ownership was some-
what restrictive when compared to more generous forms of public re-
source sharing.18 Such a distinction is easily seen when comparing the 
English view with the more liberal sharing philosophy of the medieval 
French, who extended public ownership to other natural resources and 
placed less emphasis on private ownership rights: “‘[T]he public high-
ways and byways, running water and springs, meadows, pastures, forest, 
heaths and rocks . . . are not to be held by lords, . . . nor are they to be 
maintained . . . in any other way than that their people may always be 
able to use them.’”19 Nonetheless, the English system remained ªrmly 
within the original spirit of public trust, as it favored the ancient public 
right to access navigable waterways.20
 Following the Revolutionary War, public trust principles surfaced 
in the American legal system as well.21 The demand for these princi-
ples was not surprising, given the importance of navigable waterways 
at the country’s beginning and the inherited inºuence of English 
common law.22 The navigable waterways were a central feature of 
early public policy, and political leaders understood their signiªcance 
                                                                                                                      
16 Id. 
17 Id.; see George P. Smith II, Restricting the Concept of the Free Seas: Modern 
Maritime Law Re-evaluated 14–20 (1980) (discussing the historical origins of these two 
theories). See generally Arnold L. Lum, How Goes the Public Trust Doctrine: Is the Common Law 
Shaping Environmental Policy?, Nat. Resources & Env’t, Fall 2003, at 73. 
18 See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 430–31. 
19 Id. at 429 n.22 (quoting Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its His-
torical Shackles, 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 185, 189 (1980) (citing M. Bloch, French Rural 
History 183 (1966))). 
20 Id. at 430. The need for this public right was premised upon public demand. For ex-
ample, the beds and banks of the navigable rivers were commonly used by the populace 
for anchoring and mooring. Id. at 430 n.29. Moreover, the waterways were utilized for 
other activities, such as commerce and ªshing. Id. at 431–33. The public’s need for sub-
stantial use of these navigable waterways dictated the establishment of a public right. Such 
an established right was a powerful tool, as it prevailed over any corresponding private 
property right. See id. at 430 n.29. 
21 See Anna R.C. Caspersen, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Impossibility of 
“Takings” by Wildlife, 23 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 357, 360 (1996). 
22 Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 431. 
312 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 33:307 
in economic terms.23 Among others, Thomas Jefferson imagined the 
great beneªts that watercourses could provide to commerce as he 
commissioned the Lewis and Clark expedition to “‘explore the river 
Missouri, from its mouth to its source.’”24 Early efforts were made to 
provide public access to waterways for commercial beneªt, and their 
preservation was viewed as a “unifying factor” in the country’s effort 
to facilitate trade and “establish[] communication lines among the 
states.”25 Moreover, Congress implemented resource legislation that 
administered rules of water trafªcking.26
 Because of the “intrinsic importance” of this resource legislation, 
the Supreme Court of the United States moved quickly to resolve a 
number of constitutional issues related to watercourse regulation.27 For 
example, early questions were raised regarding western states’ owner-
ship rights to the lands beneath the waterways.28 The Court concluded 
that submerged lands passed by implication to the states at the time of 
statehood under a principle of “equal footing.”29 Additionally, the 
Court examined the scope of Congressional authority under the Com-
merce Clause and determined that Congress still maintained the power 
to regulate waterways despite a state’s right to title.30
 From this rich history regarding governmental control of the wa-
terways, the public trust doctrine ofªcially emerged as an instrument 
of federal common law to preserve the public’s interest in free naviga-
tion and ªshing.31 In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, the Su-
preme Court declared that the nature of a state’s title to submerged 
                                                                                                                      
23 See id. at 431–39. Watercourse transportation caught the eye of business entrepre-
neurs. Id. at 434–35. The rivers furnished routes that avoided both dense forests and ex-
pensive road construction. Id. Moreover, the need for ªshing served both commercial and 
subsistence purposes. Id. at 431–34. 
24 Id. at 437 (citing P. Cutright, A History of the Lewis and Clark Journals 12 
(1976) (quoting Thomas Jefferson)). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 437–38 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)) (“‘[T]he 
power over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects for which the 
people of America adopted their government, and must have been contemplated in form-
ing it.’”). Professor Wilkinson identiªes four other constitutional provisions which empha-
size Congress’s paramount concern for the public use of waterways: the Tonnage Duty 
Clause; the Import-Export Clause; the Ports and Vessels Clause; and the Admiralty Clause. 
Id. at 437 n.53. 
27 See id. at 439. 
28 Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 439–40. 
29 Id. at 443–45. 
30 Id. at 449. 
31 See Public Trust Doctrine, http://law.utoledo.edu/LIGL/public_trust_doctrine.htm 
(last viewed Jan. 5, 2005). 
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lands is different from that it holds in other lands.32 “It is a title held 
in trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation 
of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of 
ªshing therein . . . .”33 In this regard, the Supreme Court placed an 
afªrmative duty on states to assist with protecting the people’s com-
mon law right to access waterways.34
 Although the Supreme Court has never expressly stated so, the 
concept of the public trust and the resulting afªrmative duties seem to 
emanate from the Constitution.35 While other interpretations of the 
public trust source exist, this is the most reasonable explanation con-
sidering the “heavy overlay of constitutional doctrine” concerning wa-
tercourse regulation.36
 Commerce Clause decisions have consistently highlighted the 
Framers’ concern for free trade and navigation, and the Court has cast 
                                                                                                                      
32 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). 
33 Id. While Illinois Central allows for the severance of lands from the public trust, it is 
seen as an exception, not the norm, to the rule of inalienability—with no presumption 
that a mere conveyance of lands within the public trust affects such a severance. A. Dan 
Tarlock, Law of Water Rights and Resources § 8.22 (Marie-Joy Paredes & Susan Mau-
ceri eds., 17th release 2005). Any state action which creates a severance may not impair the 
state’s overall ability to fulªll trust purposes. Id. 
34 See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 453–55. It has been argued that the core of the Illinois 
Central case is more properly concerned with the Contract Clause of the Constitution of 
the United States—with the reserved powers doctrine being used to reduce the ambit of 
the Clause itself. Douglas L. Grant, Underpinnings of the Public Trust Doctrine: Lessons from 
Illinois Central Railroad, 33 Ariz. St. L.J. 849, 851 (2001). Thus construed, the public 
trust doctrine should be placed within the broader doctrine of reserved powers, the source 
of which is commonly found in constitutional provisions on “legislative power” that is sup-
ported ultimately by creditable democratic political theory. Id. 
Illinois Central has also been considered to be an ill-reasoned decision—with the public 
trust analysis being more correctly seen as dictum and “as persuasive, rather than manda-
tory, authority”—because it lacks a foundation both in the Constitution and the federal 
common law. Furthermore, the case relies on a misreading of the scope of state power, 
since “state regulatory power is not lost upon a transfer of property rights to a private en-
tity.” Eric Pearson, Illinois Central and the Public Trust Doctrine in State Law, 15 Va. Envtl. 
L.J. 713, 740 (1996). 
Rather than assessing the validity or invalidity of the public trust doctrine in Illinois 
Central, it is suggested that the case be assessed by probing the “standard narrative” of the 
case itself. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public 
Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 799, 803 (2004). 
This dramatically reveals a rich political history and shows corruption, most probably, by 
the railroad in getting the Illinois state legislature to pass the Lake Front Act of 1869. See 
id. at 803–04. This Act, which was repealed in 1873, granted the entire Chicago lakefront, 
including the lake bed, of over one thousand acres to a private entity, Illinois Central, for 
use and development. See id. 
35 See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 458–59. 
36 Id. at 458. 
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a constitutional ºavor on both state and federal obligations regarding 
watercourse preservation.37 Since the Illinois Central decision, the public 
trust doctrine has ºourished as a national value, inherited from an an-
cient script of human reason and shaped by the words and spirit of the 
Constitution. 
 But how far should the public trust extend? The traditional “zone 
of public trust rights” encompasses only navigable waterways.38 The 
signiªcance of the Constitution is that it sets boundaries and a con-
text for state courts and legislatures who must devise remedies for fu-
ture public trust applications.39 Thus, it is important to explore the 
basic constitutional values underlying the public trust doctrine to de-
termine its appropriate reach. 
II. The Natural Law, the Constitution, and the Public Trust 
 Whenever a doctrine is said to lie within the basic precepts of the 
Constitution of the United States, caution must be taken in embrac-
ing the validity of the argument.40 This country is rooted in the ideals 
and values that are carefully scripted in the words of the Constitution, 
and as one Newsweek writer has noted: “Words matter. . . . [T]he 
Founding Fathers felt obligated to spell out their reasons for declar-
                                                                                                                      
37 See Victor John Yannacone, Jr., Agricultural Lands, Fertile Soils, Popular Sovereignty, the 
Trust Doctrine, Environmental Impact Assessment and the Natural Law, 51 N.D. L. Rev. 615, 
627–29 (1975). The Court ªrst cast its constitutional light on the principle of public trust 
in Martin v. Waddell “when it construed the early colonial charters as reafªrming public 
rights.” Id. at 629 (citing Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842)). The Court 
would later state in Illinois Central that there was no such thing as an “irrevocable convey-
ance of property,” as it violated the public trust. Id. Finally, in Shivley v. Bowlby, the Court 
“extended the English common law trust doctrine to a major river in Oregon” and “recog-
nized the trust doctrine as a basic element of equitable jurisprudence.” Id. (citing Shivley v. 
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1(1894)). 
38 Jack H. Archer et al., The Public Trust Doctrine and the Management of 
America’s Coasts 15–16 (1994) (internal quotations omitted). See generally Jan S. Stevens, 
The Public Trust: A Sovereign’s Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People’s Environmental Right, 14 
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 195 (1980). 
39 See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 464. The creation and regulation of property rights 
within state boundaries is an important power left to the states. See Archer et al., supra 
note 38, at 7. 
40 See Scalia, supra note 9, at 37–47. Original meaning is a concept that brings 
strength and stability to the Constitution. Id. at 47. Doctrines that are “found” within the 
Constitution run the risk of bringing new meaning to its once “rock-solid, unchanging” 
text. Id. “If the courts are free to write the Constitution anew, they will, by God, write it the 
way the majority wants . . . . By trying to make the Constitution do everything that needs 
doing from age to age, we shall have caused it to do nothing at all.” Id. 
2006] The Public Trust and Natural Law 315 
ing independence from England, out of what Thomas Jefferson called 
a ‘decent respect to the opinions of mankind.’”41
 This thought is particularly meaningful, since it describes the 
Framers’ desire to put into words those laws that embrace a greater 
“common good,” reached through a process of rational thinking. 
Thus, any analysis regarding the public trust should begin with the 
Framers’ intention and the words of the Constitution.42
 Despite the skepticism amongst modern constitutional scholars 
who reject any Natural Law meaning within the Constitution, the 
Natural Law elements of the Constitution still matter.43 The natural 
rights of human beings are directly referenced within the text that has 
been referred to as “that anchor, that rock, that unchanging institu-
tion that forms the American polity.”44 For the purposes of evaluating 
the public trust, two important sections of the Constitution appear 
relevant:45
“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained 
by the people.”46
“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people.”47
 One reason for James Madison’s submission of the Ninth 
Amendment was to clarify that an individual’s rights were not limited 
                                                                                                                      
41 Michael Barone, In History’s Words, U.S. News & World Rep., Sept. 22, 2003, at 34. 
42 See infra notes 51–59 and accompanying text. This is especially important because 
the public trust doctrine was adopted in Illinois Central based upon constitutional values. 
See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 453–55. 
43 See Douglas W. Kmiec, Is the American Democracy Compatible with the Catholic Faith?, 41 
Am. J. Juris. 69, 70–71 (1996) (explaining that because the Declaration of Independence 
and the Constitution, “as a matter of foundational theory [are] inseparable,” and the Dec-
laration references “self-evident truths” both documents are tied to objective truth); see also 
Terry Brennan, Natural Rights and the Constitution: The Original “Original Intent,” 15 Harv. 
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 965, 971–72 (1992) (concluding that the Founding Fathers recognized 
“the principles of natural law and natural rights”). 
44 Justice Antonin Scalia, Remarks at The Catholic University of America: A Theory of 
Constitution Interpretation (Oct. 18, 1996), available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/ 
legaldocs/rights/scalia.html. Ironically, Justice Scalia rejects the use of Natural Law in 
interpreting the Constitution. Id. While he adamantly supports interpreting the Constitu-
tion according to its text, he characterizes the use of Natural Law as an unworkable 
method of interpretation because of its vulnerability to subjective interpretation. Id. 
45 See Yannacone, supra note 37, at 617–18 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IX, X). 
46 Id. at 618 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IX (emphasis added)). 
47 Id. (quoting U.S. Const. amend. X (emphasis added)). 
316 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 33:307 
to the enumerated rights listed in the preceding eight amendments.48 
As a matter of fact, the Ninth Amendment was adopted as a “source of 
substantive rights” allocated to all citizens by the hand of God “to pre-
serve the existence and dignity of human beings in a free society.”49 
This recognition of a “higher law political philosophy” is crucial to 
understanding the thinking of the Framers.50
 Indeed, references to Natural Law authority dominated early 
writings and served as the imprint of the country’s constitutional 
soul.51 In property law terms, the Framers in the Natural Law tradi-
tion viewed “God as the ultimate holder in fee simple, with men and 
women holding possessory, but defeasible, interests in life.”52 More-
over, Natural Law is premised upon the notion that men have a “duty 
                                                                                                                      
48 See James Madison, Address Before the First Congress ( June 8, 1789), in The Com-
plete Bill of Rights: The Drafts, Debates, Sources, and Origins 56 (Neil H. Cogan 
ed., 1997) (“I conclude from this view of the subject, that it will be proper in itself, and 
highly politic, for the tranquility of the public mind, and the stability of the government, 
that we should offer something, in the form I have proposed, to be incorporated in the 
system of government, as a declaration of the rights of the people.”); see also Yannacone, 
supra note 37, at 653 (“Historically, the ninth amendment was included in the Bill of 
Rights to nullify the argument that the enumerated rights set forth in the preceding eight 
amendments were intended to be the only rights protected.”). 
49 See Yannacone, supra note 37, at 653. 
50 See, e.g., Rice, supra note 8, at 22–23. As Professor Charles Rice describes, the Natu-
ral Law philosophy is more than an aspiration or theory, it is a workable solution, for all 
humans, in responding to the day’s challenging issues. See id. at 23. Moreover, it exceeds 
the role of a philosophical background to the Constitution—it is an objective standard that 
can be measured through reasoned reºection similar to that of the common law. See id. at 
27. Finally, it serves as a standard for both citizens and states in the creation of new laws. 
See id. at 30. The Ten Commandments and other prescriptions of the divine law address 
speciªcally how to apply the Natural Law. Id. at 28. 
51 One needs to look no further than the words and deeds of the most inºuential 
leaders in early American history. Alexander Hamilton once noted: “The sacred rights of 
mankind are not to be rummaged for, among old parchments, or musty records. They are 
written, as with a sun beam, in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of the divin-
ity itself; and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power.” Alexander Hamilton, The 
Farmer Refuted, in 1 The Founders’ Constitution 90, 91 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph 
Lerner eds., 1987); see also Douglas W. Kmiec, America’s “Culture War”—The Sinister Denial of 
Virtue and the Decline of Natural Law, 13 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev 183, 188 (1993). Perhaps 
the most convincing evidence of the higher law political philosophy is Thomas Jefferson’s 
Declaration of Independence, which makes numerous references to man’s unalienable 
rights as bestowed by the “Creator.” The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 
1776). “The fact is that the Declaration is the best possible condensation of the natural 
law—common law doctrines as they were developed and expounded in England and 
America for hundreds of years prior to the American Revolution.” Clarence E. Manion, 
The Natural Law Philosophy of Founding Fathers, 1 Nat. L. Inst. Proc. 3, 16 (1949). 
52 Douglas W. Kmiec, Natural-Law Originalism—Or Why Justice Scalia (Almost) Gets It 
Right, 20 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 627, 650 (1997). 
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to preserve [them]selves” while maintaining “a correlative right to be 
free in the performance of that duty.”53
 Considering this Natural Law template, it is proper to examine 
the public trust doctrine within its constitutional framework. It is clear 
that the Natural Law duty to preserve one’s self and duty to others can 
carry conºicting messages.54 On the one hand, it seems as if Natural 
Law promotes the protection of individual rights, such as the right of 
a property owner to be free in excluding others.55 At the same time, 
there seems to be a “common good” that takes priority over all other 
“individual goods.”56
 As has been observed, “[t]he human law cannot rightly be di-
rected toward the merely private welfare of one or some of the mem-
bers of the community.”57 This “natural tension” is played out within 
the Constitution’s text as well. For example, the Takings Clause pro-
hibits the government from forcing some individuals to bear burdens 
which should be rightfully “borne by the public as a whole.”58 Yet, the 
language of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments refers to rights and 
powers that are retained by the “people,” such as the fundamental 
right of the populace to preserve natural resources.59 The end result 
is a Constitution that not only emphasizes individual property rights, 
but also recognizes the right of “sovereign people” to collectively “de-
termine the highest and best use of land and natural resources.”60
 Such a balanced approach seems appealing on its face, but 
difªcult to effectuate. Throughout the history of American jurispru-
dence, this balance has been difªcult to maintain as both property 
and the police power—exercised on behalf of the people—are “inde-
terminate concepts whose interpretations change over time and from 
place to place.”61 As a result, many of the Supreme Court of the 
United States decisions that have attempted to solve the tension be-
                                                                                                                      
53 Id. at 651 (emphasis omitted). 
54 See Yannacone, supra note 37, at 649 (“The ancient controversy over the nature of 
law (ius)—whether ius quia iustum (the law is that which is just) or ius quia iussum (the law 
is that which is commanded)—is more than a mere etymological quibble.”). 
55 See Rice, supra note 8, at 56. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 57. 
58 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
59 See Yannacone, supra note 37, at 618. 
60 Id. 
61 Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, 19 Harv. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol’y 147, 147 (1995). 
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tween these two elements have been viewed as “incoherent” or “cate-
gorical.”62
 The public trust doctrine is no stranger to this tension.63 The 
doctrine emerged on the idea that title to a state’s land under naviga-
ble waters could never be surrendered irrevocably to private inter-
ests.64 Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. United States was a signiªcant blow 
to a private railroad company that sought to capitalize through the 
state’s absolute grant of title by controlling a substantial part of the 
waterfront on Lake Michigan.65 Despite the Constitution’s strong rec-
ognition of individual property rights,66 it was clear “that the Court 
conceived of a general [public] trust [principle] that applied to all 
states” at all times.67
 Can such a decision that creates “public trust” rights be justiªed? 
If so, how far can a state government go in mandating public access to 
natural resources or restricting a private landowner’s rights? The best 
answer lies within the text of the Constitution and its Natural Law 
principles. 
 Marcus Tullius Cicero once stated that law was “the highest rea-
son, implanted in Nature, which commands what ought to be done 
and forbids the opposite.”68 Without a doubt, the greatest feature of 
Natural Law is that it attempts to ªnd the right answers through ra-
                                                                                                                      
62 Id. 
63 See Archer et al., supra note 38, at 177 (referencing the existence of historical con-
ºict between public and private interests with respect to the public trust doctrine). 
64 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. United States, 146 U.S. 387, 452–53 (1892). 
65 See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 452–53. 
66 See Yannacone, supra note 37, at 618. 
67 See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 454. 
68 Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces into the Takings Puzzle, Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 995, 998 n.16 (1997) (quoting Marcus Tullius Cicero, Laws—Book I, 
reprinted in The Great Legal Philosophers: Selected Readings in Jurisprudence 42, 
44 (Clarence Morris ed., 1959)). Marcus Tullius Cicero (c. 106–43 B.C.), one of the great-
est orators and philosophers of politics in ancient Rome, believed that many of the 
difªculties experienced in the Roman Republic could be attributed to the corruption and 
lack of virtuous character amongst political leaders. Edward Clayton, Cicero (c. 106–43 
B.C.), ch. 3 Cicero’s Thought, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2005), http://www. 
utm.edu/research/iep/c/cicero.htm. Cicero believed “virtuosity” had been the main at-
tribute to success in the earlier days of Roman history. Id. Corruption was particularly 
rampant in the Senate where social status, fame, wealth, and power took priority. Id. Cicero 
hoped that leaders would self-reform their lack of commitment to individual virtue and 
then pass legislation enforcing similar standards. Id. Unfortunately, most Romans were 
more interested in practical matters of the law—such as governance and military strat-
egy—than they were in Cicero’s virtuous philosophy. Id. In 27 B.C., the Roman Republic 
was dissolved and the Senate conferred great powers to Caesar Augustus. Id. 
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tional thought and reºection, just as the Common Law has done for 
hundreds of years.69
 Coming to a rational conclusion with competing constitutional 
values can be difªcult, but the task must be undertaken.70 The “com-
mon good” is an aspect of Natural Law that would seemingly answer the 
question at hand. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Natural Law’s greatest pro-
ponent, “makes it clear that the human law is not some arbitrary impo-
sition,” but a rule of reason for the “common good” that remains an 
integral “part of God’s design.”71 Whether the “common good” favors 
private property interests or public interests is a matter of Natural Law 
application and rational deduction. Professor Charles Rice, a Natural 
Law scholar, describes Natural Law as a “rule of reason, promulgated by 
God in man’s nature, whereby man can discern how he should act.”72 
In essence, God has instilled “a certain, knowable nature into man to 
follow if he is to achieve his ªnal end, which is eternal happiness with 
God in heaven.”73
 The ªrst major premise of Natural Law is that good should be 
done and evil should be avoided.74 People can determine what is 
good by examining their natural inclinations, which includes seeking 
                                                                                                                      
69 See Kmiec, supra note 52, at 650. Professor Kmiec explains appropriately that the 
common law is “the gradual exposition of natural law in context and over time.” For an in 
depth explanation of this concept, see Douglas W. Kmiec & Stephen B. Presser, The 
History, Philosophy and Structure of the American Constitution 122–26 (1998). 
“The Common Law thought pattern” has consisted traditionally of three elements: “[the] 
law of God, [the] law of nature, and [the] law of man.” Id. at 122. The application of these 
elements has been premised on the idea that “reasoned discovery of human nature” would 
ªnd the answers to challenging questions of the day. Id. Following King Henry VIII’s break 
with the Catholic Church, the belief that a legislature or a King could rule without limit 
caused many to overlook God in the parliamentary process. Id. However, Natural Law’s 
dedication to the rationality of human nature “refused to die” and passed to America’s 
Constitution. Id. 
70 History has demonstrated that Natural Law is needed to resolve conºicting ele-
ments of the Constitution. For example, in Dred Scott v. Sanford, the Supreme Court failed 
to resolve the morally conºicting slavery provisions of the Constitution with the Fifth 
Amendment right to due process. See generally 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). Natural Law 
resolves this discord for the modern scholar because it unmistakably opposes the treat-
ment of a slave as “sub-human” because of the inseparability of humanity and personhood. 
See Kmiec, supra note 51, at 194; Charles E. Rice, Some Reasons for a Restoration of Natural 
Law Jurisprudence, 24 Wake Forest L. Rev. 539, 568–69 (1989). The standard is further 
explained by Aquinas who stated that “human law . . . may be unjust as ‘contrary to human 
good’ when ‘burdens are imposed unequally on the community.’” Id. at 568 (quoting T. 
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, II, Q. 96, art. 4). 
71 See Rice, supra note 8, at 56. 
72 Id. at 44. 
73 Id. at 44–45. 
74 Id. at 45. 
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good, preserving their own existence, preserving species, living in 
community with others, and using their intellect to know truth and to 
make decisions.75 These Natural Law principles have maintained a 
continuing validity by virtue of their derivation from human nature, a 
creation of God.76
 In property disputes, one must be careful not to automatically 
equate public sharing with the “common good.”77 As Aquinas pointed 
out, “human affairs are conducted in [a] more orderly fashion if each 
man is charged with taking care of some particular thing himself, 
whereas there would be confusion if everyone had to look after any 
one thing indiscriminately.”78 Therefore, Aquinas spoke of a reason-
able method of resolution: “Wherefore laws should take account of 
many things, as to persons, as to matters, and as to times.”79 This phi-
losophy neither excludes the rights of individual property owners, nor 
discounts the validity of the public’s right to access natural resources. 
Rather, it suggests that all factors be taken into consideration before 
deciding upon the issue at hand. 
 As both public and private interests are deemed important in 
constitutional matters, the most logical method to choosing one 
course of action over another would be the balancing of private prop-
                                                                                                                      
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Rice, supra note 8, at 62. As Professor Rice explains, the “common good ‘cannot be 
deªned except in reference to the human person. . . . In the name of the common good, 
the public authorities are bound to respect the fundamental and inalienable rights of the 
human person.’” Id. (quoting Aquinas, supra note 70, at II, II, Q. 66, art. 2). Others have 
described the “common good” as a social state which: 
guarantees to each person that place in the community which belongs to him 
and in which he can freely develop his God-given talents, so that he can attain 
his own bodily, spiritual and moral perfection and so that, through his service 
to the community, he himself can become richer in external and internal 
goods. 
Philosophical Dictionary 62–63 (Walter Brugger ed., Kenneth Baker trans., 1972). 
78 See Rice, supra note 8, at 235 (quoting Aquinas, supra note 70, at II, II, Q. 66, art. 2). 
It should be noted, however, that Aquinas did not intend for an exclusive focus on individ-
ual property rights. See id. (quoting Aquinas, supra note 70, at II, II, Q. 66, art. 2). In the 
words of Aquinas, “[A] rich man does not act unlawfully if he anticipates someone in tak-
ing possession of something which at ªrst was common property, and gives others a share: 
but he sins if he excludes others indiscriminately from using it . . . .” Id. at 236 (alterations 
in original). Pope John Paul II has spoken to this issue as well. In Centesimus Annus, the 
Holy Father talks about “the necessity and therefore the legitimacy of private ownership as 
well as the limits which are imposed on it . . . . God gave the earth to the whole human 
race for the sustenance of all its members, without excluding or favoring anyone.” Id. (cit-
ing Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus (May 1, 1991)). 
79 See id. at 57 (quoting Aquinas, supra note 70, at I, II, Q. 96, art. 1). 
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erty rights against the state’s interest in natural resource preservation. 
After balancing these factors, the means that produces the greatest 
amount of good for preserving human life would best fulªll Natural 
Law’s demand for the “common good.”80
 It is not hard to justify the limited reach of the public trust doc-
trine in this respect. A rational person can see how the balancing of 
constitutional values would implicitly require protection of the navi-
gable waterways. As the Illinois Central Court observed, economic ex-
clusion from the navigable waterways would be detrimental to the 
state’s overall commercial interests, and no private interest could con-
ceivably outweigh such a signiªcant economic need.81 Natural Law 
itself recognizes that economic freedom is an essential element to re-
alizing personal freedom, and a vast number of citizens have relied 
upon the freedom to navigate since the country’s formative years.82
 Taking into account the economic lifelines provided by the coun-
try’s waterways, it is not surprising that the Court adopted the public 
trust doctrine as a matter of constitutional importance. The doctrine 
was not founded upon an abstract desire for increased public access, 
but rather a balanced common law protection of economic rights re-
tained by the people.83 Since “the ribbons of waterways tied the early 
                                                                                                                      
80 See George P. Smith, II, Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an Historical Revisionist 
Theory of Contemporary Economic Jurisprudence, 74 Neb. L. Rev. 658, 674–75 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Smith, Nuisance Law] (linking the “Golden Rule” and ethical conduct to economic well-
being and human happiness). See generally George P. Smith, II, Re-validating the Doctrine of 
Anticipatory Nuisance, 29 Vt. L. Rev. 687 (2005) (arguing that anticipatory nuisance actions 
provide another ºexible environmental remedy to prevent waste and the degradation of 
the environment). 
81 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 454 (1892) (“The harbor of Chicago is 
of immense value to the people of the State of Illinois in the facilities it affords to its vast 
and constantly increasing commerce; and the idea that its legislature can deprive the State 
of control over its bed and waters and place the same in the hands of a private corporation 
created for a different purpose . . . is a proposition that cannot be defended.”) (emphasis 
added). 
82 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. However, it must be remembered that 
Natural Law does not view economic freedom as an absolute right. See Rice, supra note 8, 
at 237. 
83 See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452. The Court in Illinois Central pointed out: 
 [t]hat the state holds the title to the lands under the navigable waters of 
Lake Michigan . . . by the common law, we have already shown, and that title 
necessarily carries with it control over the waters above them whenever the 
lands are subjected to use. . . . It is a title held in trust for the people of the 
State that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce 
over them, and have liberty of ªshing therein freed from the obstruction or 
interference of private parties. 
Id. 
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nation together—economically, politically, and symbolically,”84 the 
public trust doctrine ºows naturally from the Constitution’s articu-
lated values under the Commerce Clause and the Ninth Amendment, 
and complements Natural Law’s right to self-preservation. 
III. The Expanding Trust 
 While Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois and its succeeding 
cases established that the Constitution of the United States has “mini-
mum requirements” set for the public trust, much of the modern fo-
cus remains on the coverage of the public trust beyond traditional 
navigable waterways.85 In 1988, the Supreme Court of the United 
States took on the public trust concept directly. In Phillips Petroleum 
Co. v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court held that Mississippi received 
ownership of all its lands under waters that were subject to the “ebb 
and ºow” rule, extending the reach of the public trust to the tide-
lands.86 Although the case did not directly determine whether the 
public had a right to access these waters under the public trust doc-
                                                                                                                      
While some have suggested that the Court’s decision in Illinois Central supports greater 
public access, regardless of the common law’s economic reasoning, a careful reading un-
covers a uniquely economic aspect of the public trust: 
The interest of the people in the navigation of the waters and in commerce over 
them may be improved in many instances by the erection of wharves, docks 
and piers therein, for which purpose the State may grant parcels of the sub-
merged lands; and, so long as their disposition is made for such purpose, no 
valid objections can be made to the grants. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
This language suggests that a minor infringement on the trust may be allowed to 
promote the economic development of the submerged land. Hence, the underlying pur-
pose of the trust would seem to be economics. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 
U.S. 469, 488 (1988) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Because the fundamental purpose of the 
public trust is to protect commerce, the scope of the public trust should parallel the scope 
of federal admiralty jurisdiction.”). 
84 See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 438. The economic signiªcance of the waterways 
should not be underestimated. See id. Public trust commentators have noted that the na-
tion demanded cheap access to transportation and an end to sectional rivalries in order to 
preserve the Union and achieve economic welfare. Id. (quoting William J. Hull & 
Robert W. Hull, The Origin and Development of the Waterways Policy of the 
United States 8 (1967)). 
85 See Archer et al., supra note 38, at 13 (“[I]t is apparent that a state may increase 
the universe of public trust uses beyond the traditional areas of navigation, commerce, and 
ªshing, as well as narrow its involvement by granting private rights in these lands.”); see also 
Lum, supra note 17. 
86 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1998). 
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trine, it held open the possibility that states had “unfettered discretion 
in administering the trust.”87
 This case clearly warrants attention because of the implication 
that protection under the public trust could expand beyond its tradi-
tional scope.88 In her dissenting opinion in Phillips Petroleum, Justice 
O’Connor put the matter in its proper perspective: “[T]his case pre-
sents an issue that we never have decided: whether a State holds in 
public trust all land underlying tidally inºuenced waters that are nei-
ther navigable themselves nor part of any navigable body of water.”89 
As Justice O’Connor’s opinion highlighted, the Phillips Petroleum deci-
sion could be problematic for the rational thinker: “American cases 
have developed the public trust doctrine in a way that is consistent 
with its common-law heritage. Our precedents explain that the public 
trust extends to navigable waterways because its fundamental purpose 
is to preserve them for common use for transportation.”90
 In determining that the public trust should be expanded to 
reach those tidelands under an “ebb and ºow” standard, most would 
hope that the Phillips Petroleum majority found suitable reasons for the 
expansion. Moreover, it would seem ªtting for the Court to explain 
why its “tidal test” is superior to the traditional “navigability test” in 
supporting the underlying purpose of the public trust. The Court did 
mention that lands beneath the tidal waters may be used for ªshing,91 
but failed to show how the limited public interest in ªshing out-
weighed the traditional interests associated with private ownership.92
 Instead of discussing the fundamental purpose of the public trust 
doctrine in protecting commercial and economic interests, the major-
ity loosely stated that individual states have always enjoyed “the au-
                                                                                                                      
87 See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 462. 
88 See Archer et al., supra note 38, at 12 (“The Phillips Petroleum decision may have 
signiªcant implications for future exercises of state authority over public trust lands.”). 
89 Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 485 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor noted 
that the “Court has deªned the public trust repeatedly in terms of navigability.” Id. at 485–
86. 
90 Id. at 487. The dissent cites prior decisions as well. “‘It is, indeed, the susceptibility 
to use as highways of commerce which gives sanction to the public right of control over 
navigation upon [navigable waterways], and consequently to the exclusion of private own-
ership, either of the waters or the soils under them.’” Id. at 488 (quoting Packer v. Bird, 
137 U.S. 661, 667 (1891)). 
91 Id. at 476 (majority opinion). 
92 Id. This failure of showing is quite serious, as there is no precedent for the majority 
to hang its hat on. As Justice O’Connor properly warns, “[t]he Court’s decision departs 
from our precedents, and I fear that it may permit grave injustice to be done to innocent 
property holders in coastal States.” Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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thority to deªne the limits of the lands held in public trust and to 
recognize private rights in such lands as they see ªt.”93 Counter to 
common law reasoning, the decision seems “purely artiªcial and arbi-
trary as well as unjust.”94
 The Phillips Petroleum recognition of an expanded trust could have 
profound implications. Not only could it be argued that a property 
owner must be restricted in using tidelands according to the wishes of 
the state, but the owner could also be wholly evicted from the area 
without warning, reasonable expectation, or compensation under the 
theory that a state holds the tidelands in trust for the people.95 Consti-
tutionally speaking, the notion that a state should control the scope of 
the trust is not too offensive so long as it accounts for competing con-
stitutional values.96
  Undoubtedly, the Phillips Petroleum case gave the public trust doc-
trine a troubling new role in expanding state police power. By recog-
nizing that a state may deªne the extent of the lands that it holds in 
public trust, the Court ignored some important features of the origi-
nal doctrine. 
 First, the Court empowered the states with the right to determine 
which submerged lands are reserved under the public trust, but failed 
to review the underlying principles of the doctrine’s constitutional 
                                                                                                                      
93 See id. at 475 (majority opinion). The majority casually rejects the doctrine’s funda-
mental commercial purpose as being one of many interests that is established by the state 
in setting the limits for the public trust. See id. at 475–76. Ironically, none of the interests 
the Court refers to are mentioned in the doctrine’s founding case, Illinois Central. See gener-
ally 146 U.S. 387 (1892). At a minimum, the Court should balance the perceived public 
interest against those of private property owners when changing the scope of the doctrine. 
94 See The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 457 (1851). 
95 See Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S at 493 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The issue is not one 
of mere speculation. As the dissent notes: 
 “Due to this attempted expansion of the [public trust] doctrine, hundreds 
of properties in New Jersey have been taken and used for state purposes with-
out compensating the record owners or lien holders; prior homeowners of 
many years are being threatened with loss of title; prior grants and state deeds 
are being ignored; properties are being arbitrarily claimed and conveyed by 
the State to persons other than the record owners; and hundreds of cases re-
main pending and untried before the state courts awaiting processing with 
the National Resource Council.” 
Id. (quoting Alfred A. Porro, Jr. & Lorraine S. Teleky, Marshland Title Dilemma: A Tidal Phe-
nomenon, 3 Seton Hall L. Rev. 323, 325–26 (1972)) (alteration in original). 
96 See generally Archer et al., supra note 38. “Before attempting to provide access to 
public trust areas or to protect public trust resources, however, a state must consider the 
prospective risk that its action will be challenged as a regulatory taking.” Id. at 82. 
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mandate.97 Moreover, the Phillips Petroleum decision allows states to as-
sign private interests more freely, which is a clear contradiction to the 
Court’s philosophy in Illinois Central and a potential abuse in takings 
cases.98 Finally, the decision opens the door to a vast expansion of state 
trust authority. As the Phillips Petroleum majority noted, “several of our 
prior decisions have recognized that the States have interests in lands 
beneath tidal waters which have nothing to do with navigation.”99
 If a state merely needs an interest to expand the limits of the 
trust, such as ªshing or “creat[ing] land for urban expansion,”100 what 
is to prevent a state from expanding the trust to avoid a takings claim 
in any situation?101 Clearly, a state maintains a wide range of interests 
in all of its lands, and the potential for authoritative abuse is now 
greater.102 It must be remembered that the term “public trust” pro-
vides an enormous shield against private interference—a private own-
er has no takings claim when he owns a “revocable title.”103
 Regardless of future court battles, one thing is certain—the scope 
of the public trust doctrine will be determined by the states. Like 
other doctrines, the public trust was created with “a set of minimum 
[constitutional] standards that can be expanded, but not contracted, 
by the states.”104 The nature and breadth of that expansion, however, 
is another matter for consideration. 
                                                                                                                      
97 Id. at 50 n.111 (“As a matter of both sound public policy and legal precedent, the 
fate of the public trust doctrine is in any event placed in the state courts.”). 
98 Id. at 57 (“The Supreme Court’s ruling permits conveyance of ownership of public 
trust lands to private parties . . . .”). 
99 Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 476. 
100 Id. 
101 One can see the danger in allowing the states to expand the trust according to “in-
terests” alone. Once the rationale for commerce or economics is taken away, there is little 
to hold the state back from asserting its “interests” in other lands that passed by title upon 
admission to the union. 
102 See James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional 
Democracy, 19 Envtl. L. 527, 548 (1989). As one skeptic points out, the Supreme Court has 
never articulated constitutional environmental rights simply by linking the Constitution to 
such claims. See id. “The courts would [then be free to] argue that because these public 
rights are protected under the public trust doctrine, they predate any private claims of 
right.” Id. 
103 See Roger W. Findley et al., Cases and Materials on Environmental Law 921 
(6th ed. 2003). Perhaps a showdown is yet to come. The Court’s recent opinion in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council offered strong support for takings claims, particularly when 
an owner is totally deprived of using his land. 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–31 (1992). However, it 
does not mention the public trust doctrine as a “categorical exception” to the deprivation 
rule. Id. at 1030–31 (listing relevant factors in applying the deprivation rule). 
104 See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 464 n.164. 
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IV. Evaluating State Public Trust Trends 
 Now that there is wide recognition of the public trust doctrine, 
much of the modern focus lies with the states who have attempted “to 
expand the doctrine as it applies to the resources in their jurisdic-
tion[s].”105 In this respect, several states have contributed signiªcantly 
to the doctrine’s application and expansion in recent years.106 Al-
though the public trust doctrine is a creature of the common law, its 
growth can be attributed to both legislative and judicial efforts.107
A. Legislative Perspective 
 Examining the public trust concept in the legislative arena is an 
important aspect of trust evaluation. As Justice Antonin Scalia notes, 
“‘the main business of government, and therefore of law, [is] legisla-
tive.’”108 The purpose of this section is to discuss the appropriate means 
for a legislature to approach the public trust concept. 
 Some states have incorporated public trust rights directly within 
the text of their state constitutions.109 Article I, Section 27 of the Penn-
                                                                                                                      
105 Fred R. Jensen, Comment, Developing the Future of Michigan Environmental Law: Ex-
panding and Blending MEPA with the Public Trust, 1989 Detroit C. L. Rev. 65, 69. 
106 Archer et Al., supra note 38, at 15–17, 15 n.1. In recent years, more attention has 
been given to the landward extension of the public trust doctrine. See Tarlock, supra note 
33, § 8.20. With respect to the traditional doctrine, ten states have statutes that speciªcally 
address the seaward limit of the doctrine: Alabama, Alaska, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, and Pennsylvania. Archer et Al., supra note 
38, at 15 n.1. Nine states have statutes that deªne the seaward limit of the doctrine some-
what vaguely: California, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, North Carolina, Ohio, South Caro-
lina, and Wisconsin. Id. One state, California, has even undertaken public trust land map-
ping. Id. at 17–18. Case law has been developing under the doctrine as well. See id. at 16 
n.1. There are twenty-two states that have applied the doctrine consistently to the three 
nautical mile limit, while ªve states have developed “less certain” case law with respect to 
the seaward limit. Id. For a comprehensive listing of state judicial postures on the ever 
expanding accommodations of the public trust, see Tarlock, supra note 33, § 8.20. 
107 See Archer et al., supra note 38, at 16. 
108 Scalia, supra note 9, at 13 (alteration in original) (quoting Lawrence M. Fried-
man, A History of American Law 590 (1973)). 
109 Article XI, Section 1, of the Hawaii Constitution states: “‘[A]ll public natural re-
sources are held in trust by the State for the beneªt of the people.’” See David L. Callies & 
J. David Breemer, Selected Legal and Policy Trends in Takings Law: Background Principles, Cus-
tom and Public Trust “Exceptions” and the (Mis)use of Investment-Backed Expectations, 36 Val. U. 
L. Rev. 339, 358 (2002) (quoting Haw. Const. art. XI, § 1). Water rights have been ex-
pressly granted in other state constitutions. See Alaska Const. art. VIII, § 3 (reserving the 
right of the people to use waters in their natural state); Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 5 (declar-
ing the “waters of every natural stream . . . to be the property of the public”); Mont. 
Const. art. II, § 3 (providing for a “clean and healthful environment” as an “inalienable 
right”); N.D. Const. art. XI, § 3 (stating that the waters are retained by the state for “min-
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sylvania Constitution states that “‘[t]he people [of the state] have a 
right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, 
scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.’”110 Moreover, 
Pennsylvania has declared its “‘public natural resources are the com-
mon property of all the people, including generations yet to come,’”111 
an extraordinary emphasis on natural resource preservation and exten-
sion of public resource rights.112
 While this direct naming of broad public trust rights puts the 
Pennsylvania property owner on edge, the citizens of Pennsylvania 
can take some comfort knowing the state legislature passed this re-
source provision under its “traditional authority” to “set public policy 
on problematic uses of land.”113 After all, there is something reassur-
ing about the right of a populace to determine its destiny through the 
“nation’s democratically-driven processes.”114
 However, it is equally important that legislatures utilizing the 
public trust doctrine do so within a set of principled limits.115 Those 
                                                                                                                      
ing, irrigating and manufacturing purposes”); Wyo. Const. art. VIII, § 1 (stating that wa-
ter is the property of the state); see also Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democrati-
zation of Western Water Law: A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 Envtl. L. 573, 576 
n.12 (1989) (elaborating on the various state statutory provisions). Additionally, some 
states use constitutional language that infers state ownership. For example, California pro-
scribes obstructing public access to navigable waters. Cal. Const. art. X, § 4. 
110 Andrew H. Shaw, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine: Protector of Pennsylvania’s Public 
Natural Resources?, 9 Dick. J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 383, 389 (2000) (quoting Pa. Const. art. I, 
§ 27). 
111 Id. (quoting Pa. Const. art. I, § 27). 
112 See Ryan, supra note 5, at 478 (“Article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania State Con-
stitution represents an ambitious modern vision of the ancient common law doctrine of 
the public trust . . . .”). 
113 John A. Humbach, “Taking” the Imperial Judiciary Seriously: Segmenting Property Interests 
and Judicial Revision of Legislative Judgments, 42 Cath. U. L. Rev. 771, 772 (1993). 
114 Id. Other state legislatures have invoked the public trust doctrine as well. In Missis-
sippi, the state legislature has described the public policy of the trust as follows: 
“[p]reservation of the natural state of the public trust tidelands and their 
ecosystems and to prevent the despoliation and destruction of them, except 
where a speciªc alternation of speciªc public trust tidelands would serve a 
higher public interest in compliance with the public purposes of the public 
trust in which such tidelands are held.” 
Columbia Land Dev., LLC v. Sec’y of State, 868 So.2d 1006, 1012 (Miss. 2004) (quoting 
Miss. Code Ann. § 29-15-3 (Rev. 2000) (alterations in original)). 
115 See Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 Cal. W. L. 
Rev. 239, 275 (1992). In arguing for an economic approach, Professor Lloyd R. Cohen 
points out why principled limits are needed with respect to the public trust doctrine: 
 Any body of law will be fuzzy around the edges; that [cannot] be helped. 
But the notion of an evolving unbounded set of communal rights—whether 
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limits are established within the laws of human nature.116 Such hu-
man nature is consistent with the constitutional values that respect 
both individual rights and public beneªt, and thus show a deªnite 
grounding in the tenets of Natural Law.117
 In setting appropriate legislative limits, Natural Law provides a 
sound philosophy for determining what is best for the “common 
good.”118 Recognizing that economic freedom is a key to personal 
freedom, but that all human beings have a right to “‘part of God’s 
gift,’” Natural Law supports the balancing perspective between prop-
erty rights and public rights.119 Moreover, Natural Law focuses on the 
welfare of the human person and how an integrated “‘society of [hu-
man] persons’” can improve the efªciency and productivity of land 
use that preserves human life.120
 When choosing resources that should be protected under the pub-
lic trust doctrine, legislatures should proceed cautiously and consider 
all factors affecting both individual property owners and the public at 
large. If such a reªned balance is achieved, public trust preservation is 
likely to prove “a more amenable result,” and the constitutionality of 
the action will not likely be challenged.121
 But what is the deciding element at the end of the day? In the 
spirit of the original doctrine and the Constitution’s Natural Law prin-
ciples, it means that public preservation of a natural resource can be 
made insofar as it retains an economic beneªt for the greater common 
good.122 Indeed, a public trust preservation that increases proªt can 
                                                                                                                      
they are constitutional or common law, procedural or substantive, in all pub-
lic and private property strips clarity, certainty, and predictability from the 
very core of the public trust doctrine. 
Id. 
116 See id. The public trust doctrine should be seen as granting equitable relief in three 
cases: where inappropriate attempts are made by governmental agencies to sell or alienate 
public trust resources to private individuals; where governmental agencies attempt to shift 
or divert a trust resource from one speciªc public use to a new and inappropriate one; and 
where a course of agency action is being pursued in derogation of the trust use which has 
the effect of either destroying the resource or giving rise to its pollution. Zygmunt J. B. 
Plater et al., Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law & Society 26–27 (3d ed. 
2004). 
117 See Kmiec & Presser, supra note 69, at 121–71. 
118 See Rice, supra note 8, at 46. 
119 Id. at 236–37 (quoting Pope John Paul II, supra note 78, at Nos. 30, 31). 
120 Id. at 242 (quoting Pope John Paul II, Laborem Exercens, No. 43 (1981)). 
121 See Humbach, supra note 113, at 780. 
122 See Rice, supra note 8, at 238 (quoting Pope John Paul II, supra note 120, at No.35). 
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better serve a society that endeavors to best “‘satisfy their basic needs’” 
while simultaneously serving the whole of humanity.123
 However, the public trust debate cannot rest entirely upon ªnd-
ing natural resources to protect. If that were the case, environmental 
advocates could simply accumulate any number of arguments that 
would provide support for an economic beneªt.124
 A proper balancing equation also requires an evaluation of the 
effects to be endured by the individual property owner. As St. Thomas 
Aquinas observed, it is perfectly “‘lawful for man to possess prop-
erty.’”125 These aspects of personal ownership are vital for several rea-
sons. First, people are more careful and efªcient when procuring for 
themselves than for the community at large.126 Second, “‘human affairs 
are conducted in [a] more orderly fashion’” when people take charge 
of their own property.127 Finally, “‘a more peaceful state’” of affairs is 
likely to endure when people are secure in their private property.128
 Aquinas wisely proffered that “‘human agreement’” on these com-
peting public and private issues must come from the positive law.129 Ac-
cordingly, the best application of the public trust in the legislative arena 
occurs when decisions are made to beneªt the common good through 
longstanding principles of human reasoning. 
 Natural Law reasoning is not difªcult in application. The Natural 
Law approach recognizes that the preservation of human life is 
good.130 In support of human life, “‘God gave the earth to the whole 
human race for the sustenance of all its members, without excluding or 
favoring anyone . . . .’”131 The conquering of the earth by human be-
ings is the means by which they provide a “‘ªtting home’” and “‘makes 
                                                                                                                      
123 Id. (quoting Pope John Paul II, supra note 120, at No. 35). 
124 It may be possible to support any environmental cause with an economic argument. 
See Cohen, supra note 115, at 273. 
In many areas of economic life it is easy to contrive a theory of why a particu-
lar market failure or political failure will result. However, if one is clever 
enough, one can also contrive a theory of precisely why the opposite failure is 
likely to occur. Each can seem, in isolation, a persuasive explanation. If sup-
ported by empirical evidence it can appear as ordained truth. 
Id. 
125 Rice, supra note 8, at 235 (quoting Aquinas, supra note 70, at II, II, Q. 66, art.1). 
126 Id. (quoting Aquinas, supra note 70, at II, II, Q. 66, art.1). 
127 Id. (quoting Aquinas, supra note 70, at II, II, Q. 66, art.1). 
128 Id. (quoting Aquinas, supra note 70, at II, II, Q. 66, art.1). 
129 Id. (quoting Aquinas, supra note 70, at II, II, Q. 66, art.1). 
130 See supra text accompanying note 77. 
131 See Rice, supra note 8, at 236 (quoting Pope John Paul II, supra note 78, at Nos. 30, 
31). 
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part of the earth his own.’”132 At the same time, human beings should 
not obstruct others from sharing in “‘part of God’s gift.’”133
 As discussed before, Natural Law reasoning can be used to justify 
the limited application of the public trust doctrine to watercourses.134 
Just as God’s earth was provided for the sustenance of its members, 
not even the private property owner can justify controlling the navi-
gable waterways to the economic detriment of so many people.135 The 
public trust doctrine is based upon the principled reasoning that pro-
tecting the vital economic interests of the community outweighs any 
barrier to free commerce.136 Similarly, any legislative enactment that 
sets aside a public trust resource should take a balancing approach. 
 It is hard to imagine another natural resource that supports as 
many people in such a signiªcant way.137 More importantly, what prin-
ciple could justify the impairment of private landowners’ rights to ef-
ªciently develop their own portion of God’s earth?138 In supporting 
life, Natural Law advocates ªnd that “[t]he right to own and dispose 
of property” is a basic human right.139 Any limitations will have to be 
                                                                                                                      
132 Id. (quoting Pope John Paul II, supra note 78, at Nos. 30, 31). 
133 Id. (quoting Pope John Paul II, supra note 78, at Nos. 30, 31). The public trust, em-
bodying as it does, fundamental conservative principles, seeks to recognize that “[t]he 
ultimate measure of a society” is to be found outside “physical needs for survival” and 
should include “the full quality of its people’s lives, and the legacy of ideas, accomplish-
ments, resources, and potentials it seeks to pass on to successor generations.” Plater et 
al., supra note 116, at 102. 
134 See supra Part II. 
135 See Yannacone, supra note 37, at 653. 
136 Even Pope John Paul II recognizes that “‘the free market is the most effective in-
strument for utilizing resources and responding to needs.’” Rice, supra note 8, at 237 
(quoting Pope John Paul II, supra note 78, at Nos. 30, 31). 
137 While environmental activists may argue that the demand for greater environ-
mental protection over the years demonstrates a greater concern for resource preserva-
tion, it does not follow that these values should be preserved as communal property rights. 
See Cohen, supra note 115, at 255. When considering the opportunity costs associated with 
inhibiting commercial development, it is hard to imagine that the continued existence of 
the waterfowl or preservation of wetlands will outweigh the cost of economic development. 
See id. “In a well functioning market economy, property will usually be put to its most valu-
able use because that is what is most proªtable to the property owner.” Id. 
138 Id. at 261. It is imperative to realize the cost of impairing the private landowner. As 
Professor Cohen notes, the uncertainties created by an uninhibited and unpredictable 
public trust expansion “fall[s] squarely on the shoulders of the property owner.” Id. The 
property owner’s ability to predict the market also creates an incentive for him to antici-
pate future events and use his property in a productive manner. See id. “[I]n that anticipa-
tion he is serving the community at large.” Id. Unlike watercourse application, applying 
the public trust to other natural resources is likely to “make property ownership more risky 
and thereby diminish the value of investing in property in ways that increase its value.” Id. 
139 See Rice, supra note 8, at 237. 
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established through sound principles that outweigh this right. Of 
course, this Article has argued that the most logical principle is eco-
nomics.140
 Legislative public trust application outside the watercourses, 
however, may be economically feasible or reasonable. While public 
trust legislation may prove controversial outside the traditional water-
course context, there are still creative ways to invoke a public trust 
concept that is congruous with its economic roots. 
 Land trusts are being utilized increasingly to provide federal tax 
breaks to developers of private property.141 These are not the tradi-
tional public trust mandates, however, but rather are legislative incen-
tives to increase resource preservation. Commonly referred to as 
“conservation easements,” landowners agree to restrict development 
on their land and “donate” the easement to a nonproªt land trust or 
a government agency.142 In exchange, the landowner is afforded a tax 
break to compensate “for the reduction in the land’s market value.”143
 These “land trust” initiatives may not only prove to be economi-
cally sound, but also to ªt squarely within the original public trust 
doctrine’s constitutional values of respecting both “jus publicum” and 
“jus privatum” rights.144 The land trust sets aside an ecological interest 
for the beneªt of the public at large.145 In most cases, the conserva-
tion easement results in preserving wildlife and natural landscape 
while preventing urban sprawl.146 At the same time, the burden of the 
land trust is not forced upon the unwilling landowner. 
                                                                                                                      
140 It has been observed that, “‘[l]aw is forward looking’ and ‘pragmatic’ and should 
be as but a servant of human needs. One of the most basic human needs is to be secure 
economically; for from that security comes an ability to purchase goods in the market 
place (e.g., food, clothing, shelter) which are necessary to sustain life at a level of enjoy-
ment and thus promote individual happiness.” See Smith, Nuisance Law, supra note 80, at 
739. 
141 Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Developers Find Payoff in Preservation; Donors Reap 
Tax Incentive by Giving to Land Trusts, but Critics Fear Abuse of System, Wash. Post, Dec. 21, 
2003, at A1. 
142 Id. at A20. In turn, these organizations certify that the restrictions are “meaningful 
and provide some public beneªt, such as preserving open space or protecting wildlife.” Id. 
at A1. 
143 Id. 
144 See supra Part II. 
145 See Stephens & Ottaway, supra note 141, at A20. Many conservationists are reporting 
positive results. This initiative has been credited with being the “fastest-growing arm of the 
environmental movement, fueling a boom in land conservation and helping to protect 
more than 6 million acres nationwide.” Id. 
146 Id. 
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 While such trust applications may seem limited in nature, they 
could provide even greater beneªts than a mandatory trust. Not only 
can land trusts increase the amount of resources preserved on behalf 
of the public, but they also can increase the proªtability margin that 
serves the community. Some researchers believe that the easements 
could increase property values by making the “neighborhoods more 
exclusive and scenic, with less density.”147
 This creative approach is anchored ªrmly within the principled 
reasons of the public trust doctrine—preserving a natural resource to 
provide an economic beneªt to the greatest number of people. At the 
same time, it respects the Natural Law balancing approach toward the 
common good. Land trusts increase the proªtability of the whole by 
respecting the rights of the individual. In the end, it might just 
achieve Aquinas’s ideal of a harmonized community. 
B. Environmental Enhancement 
 The public trust doctrine—far from being curtailed—should be 
seen as an “afªrmative instrument,” linking environmental protection 
of the biotic community with resource utilization.148 This linkage will 
perhaps validate what Dworkin termed an “equality of resources.”149 
Heretofore, the central focus of the American version of the doctrine 
has been broad public access to multiple natural resources. These re-
sources have expanded greatly from protecting shorelines and waters to 
include boating, swimming, ªshing, hunting, preserving wildlife habi-
tat, undertaking scientiªc studies, aesthetic beauty, maintaining eco-
logical integrity, and retaining open spaces, which are all seen today as 
part of “legitimate public expectations.”150 Depending upon view-
points, the doctrine’s major advantage, or disadvantage, is its “immu-
nity . . . from Fifth Amendment ‘takings’ claims.”151 This becomes an 
especially complex and volatile issue upon realizing that “fully one-
third of public trust property is in private rather than public hands, 
                                                                                                                      
147 Id. 
148 Harry R. Bader, Anteaus and the Public Trust Doctrine: A New Approach to Substantive 
Environmental Protection in the Common Law, 19 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 749, 750 (1992). 
149 See John E. Roemer, Theories of Distributive Justice 245–46 (1996). See gener-
ally Sax, supra note 19. 
150 Bader, supra note 148, at 751, 753; see also Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of 
Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 Iowa L. 
Rev. 631, 649 (1986) (detailing a number of other applications including “archaeological 
remains, and even a downtown area”). 
151 Bader, supra note 148, at 754. See generally Callies & Breemer, supra note 109, at 355–
61. 
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[and that] private property rights also exist in many such lands and wa-
ters.”152 The core issue then becomes the extent to which private prop-
erty rights are either compromised or eliminated altogether without 
any Fifth Amendment compensation—all to satisfy the voracious appe-
tite of the contemporary public trust doctrine.153
 Seen as a tool to maintain the health of natural systems rather 
than as a general environmental tool, a “new,” revised public trust 
doctrine would require an initial determination by a reviewing court 
as to whether the health of a speciªc ecological system would be im-
paired by a particular activity. This inquiry would be met by surveying 
the impact on the diversity and the stability of the threatened biotic 
community. Accordingly, the planned use would be deemed judicially 
acceptable, if found to present little, if any, threat to the biotic com-
munity. Additionally, the proposed project activity would have to meet 
the statutory conditions imposed by the Clean Water Act,154 the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act,155 and the Administrative Procedure 
Act.156 These statutory considerations would be independent of the 
public trust doctrine’s common law principles. 
 Conversely, if the activity were judicially determined to be a 
threat to environmental health, it would be either modiªed or en-
joined. In making such a determination, no balancing of social poli-
cies or cost beneªt analyses would be allowed. The “new” doctrine 
would be recognized as “an inviolable shield protecting the environ-
ment.”157 However, making this an effective judicial inquiry would 
require that the court evaluate the cumulative and “synergistic effects” 
of any proposed activity in light of other long-term projects.158 The 
uncertainty that would unavoidably be associated with such subjective 
assessments of this nature perhaps dooms the notion of expanding 
the public trust doctrine under this analysis. 
                                                                                                                      
152 Callies & Breemer, supra note 109, at 355. 
153 Id. See generally Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 Yale L.J. 
149 (1971). 
154 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000 & West Supp. 2005). 
155 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370(c) (2000). 
156 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2000 & West Supp. 2005). 
157 Bader, supra note 148, at 757–58. 
158 Id. at 758; see William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-Based 
Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive Environmental 
Value, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 385, 452 (1997) (suggesting the need for a process justiªcation for 
the judiciary in cases of this nature as well as a process-based methodology for implement-
ing such a review). 
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C. The Judicial Perspective 
 The most expansive development of the public trust doctrine will 
likely occur in state courts.159 Given the U.S. Supreme Court’s defer-
ence to the states for controlling the scope of the trust in Phillips Petro-
leum v. Mississippi, it is not surprising that a number of state courts 
have taken the initiative to expand constitutional guarantees.160 While 
state court opinions do not always indicate the source of expanding 
trust law, many have cited Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois and its 
tenet for creating public access to the watercourses as “a rule of gen-
eral applicability.”161 This standard is understood as having broad pa-
rameters, allowing states an incredible leeway for fashioning their own 
individual bodies of trust law.162
 Several western states have pursued actively the idea, as water 
rights beyond the traditional watercourses have been declared public 
trust resources through judicial opinions and legislative declaration.163 
The Arizona Supreme Court has declared that water rights are a pro-
tected resource under the state constitution and cannot be abdicated 
through legislative action.164 The Montana Supreme Court has relied 
on the public trust doctrine to guarantee access to all waters that may 
be used recreationally.165 Finally, the Washington Supreme Court has 
extended its protection of trust resources to include “tidelands, shore-
lands and beds of navigable waters.”166
 The expansion of the public trust has not been limited to mere 
water resources. In New Jersey, courts have cited the public trust doc-
trine as a means of extending the public protection of dry-sand ar-
eas.167 In Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey recognized that swimmers had a right to passage and 
access to upland sands so that they could enjoy the traditional use of 
the ocean and foreshore.168
                                                                                                                      
159 See Cathy J. Lewis, The Timid Approach of the Federal Courts to the Public Trust Doctrine: 
Justiªed Reluctance or Dereliction of Duty?, 19 Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev. 51, 55–60 
(1998); supra Part III. 
160 See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 462, 463 n.163. 
161 Id. at 463 n.163. 
162 Id. at 461–62. 
163 See Blumm, supra note 109, at 599–600. 
164 See Stephen D. Osborne et al., Laws Governing Recreational Access to Waters of the Co-
lumbia Basin: A Survey and Analysis, 33 Envtl. L. 399, 429 (2003). 
165 See id. at 435. 
166 Id. at 439–40. 
167 Callies & Breemer, supra note 109, at 359–60. 
168 471 A.2d 355, 363–66 (N.J. 1984). 
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 The Supreme Court of California has become especially creative 
and expanded the public trust doctrine to include “food and habitat 
for ªsh and wildlife, open space, and use for scientiªc study.”169 This is 
a signiªcant departure from the reasoning of traditional public trust 
application, as the California precedent recognizes protection for “en-
vironmental resources in their own right, not simply because humans 
use them.”170
 Much of the expansion regarding the public trust can be attrib-
uted to changing perceptions regarding property and the state police 
power.171 Assigning responsibility to the states for determining the 
scope of the public trust is not necessarily a bad idea, so long as state 
judges are inºuenced by sound reasoning and balanced decisionmak-
ing.172 In its constructive role, Natural Law’s rational thinking can 
beneªt court decisions by serving as “a reasonable guide to principles 
and general objectives” that promote the “common good” through a 
balanced approach, much like the operation of common law.173
 Even the Supreme Court’s most recent takings cases have empha-
sized that state common law is the best means for determining the 
proper balance between individual property rights and police power 
because “state courts are in the best position to monitor the evolution 
of these two concepts.”174 Be that as it may, judges have a speciªc re-
sponsibility to linking their extensions of the public trust doctrine to 
principled economic reasoning.175 Without it, they would not be abid-
ing by a “precedent-bound common-law system.”176 As the Natural Law 
demonstrates, such systems provide the stability, predictability, and 
                                                                                                                      
169 See Deborah Beaumont Schmidt, The Public Trust Doctrine in Montana: Conºict at the 
Headwaters, 19 Envtl. L. 675, 693 (1989) (citing Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 
1971)). 
170 Id. 
171 See Kmiec, supra note 61, at 147. 
172 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
173 See Rice, supra note 8, at 55. 
174 Kmiec, supra note 61, at 154. Two state courts—as early as 1957—presented a con-
struct or, at least, a vade mecum for state judicial forays into public trust emanations, where 
diversions in use of public trust lands are validated when: they are supervised and con-
trolled by public bodies; the areas in question are both devoted and open to the public; in 
comparing the area of original use, the diminished use is smaller than the entirety; the 
public uses within the original area are neither impaired signiªcantly nor destroyed; and 
“the disappointment of those wanting to use the area of new use for former purposes was 
negligible when compared to the greater convenience to be afforded those members of 
the public using the new facility.” Paepke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n, 263 N.E.2d 11, 19 (Ill. 
1970); see State v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 81 N.W.2d 71, 73–74 (Wis. 1957). 
175 See supra Part II. 
176 See Scalia, supra note 9, at 7. 
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efªciency that are essential to promoting the greatest amount of hu-
man happiness. 
 Certainly the common law may be an appropriate method for 
determining speciªc trust applications because of the “common sense 
of [its] ancient (yet dynamic) principle[s].”177 However, state courts 
and legislatures should be guided by exactly that—common sense 
principles that were known to the Framers. Just as the public trust 
doctrine was borne of a principled economic purpose to promote the 
common good, so too should it grow within the natural bounds of 
that purpose. If the public trust doctrine pushes the limits of this rea-
son, it may ªnd itself in the middle of a “takings puzzle.”178
D. New, Unbridled Expansion or Reasoned Application? 
 On April 23, 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit held in United States v. Snook that violations of the public trust— 
recognized normally as applicable to violations of environmental law 
by public ofªcials—could be broadened to justify increased sentences 
for industry ofªcials.179 More speciªcally, Ronald Snook—at various 
times in his career classiªed as an “Environmental Manager” or “Envi-
ronmental Specialist”—was found guilty of violating the Clean Water 
Act180 and of concealing material information.181
 As Environmental Manager at Clark Reªning and Marketing, 
Inc., a petroleum reªnery in Blue Island, Illinois, Snook was respon-
sible for maintaining the reªnery’s compliance with pertinent envi-
ronmental regulations and managing its waste water treatment sys-
tem.182 A local waste control ordinance prohibited the discharge of 
various pollutants with stated levels of concentration into a sewer sys-
tem which, in turn, ºowed into a municipal water treatment plant.183 
It also required dischargers, such as Clark Reªning, to submit reports 
of their self-monitoring compliance activities.184 Snook and an associ-
ate were found guilty by a jury of not only selectively reporting testing 
                                                                                                                      
177 Kmiec, supra note 61, at 158. 
178 See generally id. at 147–159. 
179 366 F.3d 439, 445–46 (7th Cir. 2004). 
180 Id. at 441–42 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 371; 33 U.S.C. §§ 1317(d), 1319(c)(2)(A)). 
181 Id. at 442 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1)). 
182 Id. 
183 See id. 
184 Id. 
2006] The Public Trust and Natural Law 337 
results of their discharges, but also—and perhaps more importantly— 
of the numerous violations that occurred on several occasions.185
 In his appeal, Snook argued that any position of trust which he 
held was not to the local municipality where the wastewater facility 
was situated nor to the public it served; rather, it was to Clark Reªn-
ing.186 The court rejected this contention altogether and stated, 
“[t]he Clean Water Act is public-welfare legislation and the victims of 
violations are the public.”187 Further, the court stated that “the regula-
tions here apply to matters that directly and signiªcantly affect the 
public’s health and safety.”188
 Similar current cases have strengthened and, indeed, enhanced 
the mandate of Snook,189 leading to the conclusion that a trend which 
elevates every environmental violation as an abuse of the public trust 
doctrine is developing. This, in turn, may be taken to mean that other 
health and welfare statutes will be seen as affecting public health and 
safety. 
 In a strong dissent to the majority opinion in Snook, Circuit Judge 
Coffey emphasized several points to curtail the forward thrust of the 
public trust doctrine. First, Snook was not a government employee, 
but rather a private one selected by his employer, Clark Reªning. Sec-
ond, because of this relationship, it was his employer, “not the public, 
who reposed its conªdence in Snook such that a ªduciary relation-
ship may have been created,”190 and while perhaps trusting Snook to 
conform to existing environmental regulations, “the public did not 
entrust Snook (in the sense of placing a ªduciary obligation on 
Snook) with the duty of protecting its health and welfare interests in 
the environment.”191 Third, if any ªduciary duty existed, it was to be 
found in municipal or district ofªcers—and not with either Clark Re-
ªning or Snook—whose responsibility it was to ensure compliance 
with water regulations by inspections.192 Even though an employee of 
                                                                                                                      
185 Snook, 366 F.3d at 442. 
186 Id. at 445. 
187 Id. (citing United States v. Technic Servs., Inc., 314 F.3d 1031, 1049 (9th Cir. 
2002)). 
188 Id. at 446. 
189 See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 366 F.3d 1178, 1185–86 (11th Cir. 2004); Technic 
Servs., 314 F.3d at 1049–52; United States v. Gonzalez-Alvarez, 277 F.3d 73, 81–82 (1st Cir. 
2002). 
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a private corporation may act in a manner that signiªcantly harms the 
public, as in Snook, it is absurd to conclude that that an employee is 
acting as a ªduciary or agent of the public.193
 Judge Coffey’s dissent is, by far, the more reasoned approach to 
follow in public trust cases. If unfettered judicial discretion is not 
curbed, then—absent strict legislative direction—what was, at best, 
always seen as a penumbral emanation within the Natural Law will rise 
to an unjustiªed level of legal recognition and a usurpation of state 
action. If legislatures do not act decisively in setting limits for applica-
tions of the public trust doctrine, this lethargy will surely result in fur-
ther unbridled expansions of the doctrine by the judiciary—bereft of 
its foundational framework in the Natural Law, a framework tied to 
the realization that individual property rights should only be com-
promised when the “common good” is truly advanced. 
 The reality and “application” of the Snook court for attaining an 
equilibrium between state legislative action and judicial interpretation 
is very dubious, because it is always the judiciary which not only de-
termines the doctrine’s content, but also applies it to the facts of each 
case and ultimately enforces it against the legislature and state admin-
istrative agencies.194 “The legislature has no power to abolish or mod-
ify the doctrine, either across the board or in particular situations. 
Consequently, the judiciary has the ªnal say on the validity of legisla-
tive and administrative grants of public trust resources into private 
ownership.”195
 The principle of majoritarian democracy is violated by this judi-
cial posture, since the freedom of state legislatures to determine state 
policy “except when its choices run afoul of the state constitution, the 
federal constitution, or other federal law” is not only compromised, 
but actually destroyed.196 Unfortunately, there is no settled answer or 
formula to mapping the validity of the judicial source for action here 
which empowers the courts “to reject legislative decisions regarding 
private grants of public trust resources.”197 Thus, it is incumbent upon 
the courts to impose judicial self-restraint and follow the canons of 
strict construction which should, in turn, give rise to a framework for 
principled decisionmaking which is tied to a reasonable, common-
sense balancing of the issues. The tenets of Natural Law can be of 
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great value in illuminating the judicial pathway to achieve the point of 
equilibrium in the balancing test. 
E. Tempering the Future 
 While a level of skepticism may well persist regarding the con-
temporary value of Natural Law theory—especially with the recent 
push for expansive trust rights under the rubric of a ºexible Constitu-
tion198—it is submitted here that the theory has a level of useful ap-
plication in future public trust cases. Even given the recent deferral 
by the Supreme Court to state jurisdictions in deciding disputations 
regarding property issues,199 it remains highly unlikely that the Su-
preme Court will allow the public trust doctrine to “emerge[] from 
the water and march across the land.”200
 No matter what environmental activists claim regarding the 
growth of the doctrine, the road to a broader public trust will be tem-
pered by competing property values that are mentioned speciªcally 
within the text of the Constitution.201 By referencing the logic of 
these competing values, the Natural Law originalist may successfully 
defend the public trust stance. 
 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Supreme Court an-
nounced some constitutional limits that could inhibit the public trust 
application.202 Speciªcally, the Court stated that governmental restric-
tions that seek validation upon the “‘background principles’ excep-
tion ‘cannot be newly legislated or decreed.’”203 This means that 
newly developed policies of state public trust cannot ªnd validity 
through mere judicial or legislative declaration.204 “Yet Lucas and Pa-
lazzolo [v. Rhode Island] make clear that the dispositive question is 
whether the land use restriction itself is part of shared and traditional 
limitations or, instead, a novel interpretation of state law.”205
 Additionally, the Lucas Court enunciated a working principle 
which holds that any elimination of all beneªcial use of land can be 
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defended only upon “‘an objectively reasonable application of rele-
vant precedents’” in the jurisdiction where the land is situated.206 The 
Natural Law originalist can accept this premise because the Natural 
Law philosophy is anchored in history, precedent, economic reason-
ing, and a balancing of interests.207
 The 2003 case of Champlain’s Realty Associates v. Tillson 208 is illus-
trative of a modern and reasoned application of the public trust doc-
trine. An owner of a Rhode Island marina was subjected to a regula-
tion that prevented the docking of commercial ferries.209 Passed by 
the Town of New Shoreham, the regulations directed that a cease and 
desist order be issued against the local owner of the marina.210
 Referencing the long history of the doctrine, a Rhode Island Su-
perior Court declared the local restrictive ordinance invalid and an-
nounced that the state agency was responsible, primarily for ensuring 
that the waters of the state are utilized in the most appropriate and 
beneªcial fashion for the general public.211
 In Champlain, the use of the public trust doctrine falls directly 
within its own reasonable application by supporting the state’s right to 
protect commercial interests in a valuable natural resource.212 In ad-
dition, by relying upon the historical underpinnings of the doctrine, 
the Champlain court stabilized further the very concept of the public 
trust and tied it to a ªrm foundation in principles of Natural Law. 
This, in turn, arguably supports the ultimate conclusion that when not 
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followed, any substitute legal analysis for the Natural Law framework 
will prove to be an “unstable . . . base on which to erect an ediªce of 
useful positive law.”213
Conclusion 
 The public trust is an ancient concept that has retained validity 
throughout the centuries. In American constitutional law, the public 
trust doctrine emerged from the idea that commercially protected 
interests enjoyed the right to free navigation on the watercourses.214 
While the original doctrine was somewhat simplistic, it was rooted in 
ancient values and inherited from a line of principled economic rea-
soning. This critical reasoning can be credited in part to the Natural 
Law foundation of the American Constitution.215
 Regardless of whether the public trust is made law by the legisla-
ture, exists within the common law or is structured and enlightened 
in application by the tenets of Natural Law, the doctrine has an im-
pact. The doctrine must be seen as representing and giving legal force 
to innumerable “unmarketized present and future social values” that 
are oftentimes ignored or overlooked in daily life—values that shape 
the total life experience.216
 Although the common law affecting “rivers, lakes, oceans, dunes, 
air, streams (surface and subterranean), [and] beaches,” for example, 
may not be seen as the same law affecting other “typical environ-
mental object[s],” some of these resources come within the protec-
tion of the public trust doctrine.217 As such, they could be developed 
in such a manner to achieve a broad ranging environmental protec-
tive base.218 Liberalizing legal standing for offenses against environ-
mental resources would have the added effect of supplementing con-
ventional moralities219 by engrafting an environmental ethic onto the 
public trust doctrine. Accordingly, this reconstruction could well be 
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seen as yet another sound emanation within the penumbra of Natural 
Law—one that not only takes a renewed legitimacy from this relation-
ship but consequently undergirds or validates the contemporary rele-
vance of the very doctrine itself by showing its practical outreach to 
contemporary issues of environmental management and enhancing 
the legal status of the environment by giving it legal voice.220
 However, any expansion of an environmental ethic or engraft-
ment of it onto the public trust doctrine should be tethered to a 
Natural Law template which seeks a reasoned balance in decisionmak-
ing between the rights of individual property ownership with the need 
for expanded protection of public environmental resources. In this 
way, the doctrine is given both a directional focus and a level of 
needed restraint. 
 Judicial activism has the effect of preempting a full and balanced 
discourse both to test and to shape society’s relationship with the natu-
ral environment.221 Instead of continuing to broaden the base of judi-
cial latitude for intervening, and thereby second-guessing the adminis-
trative decisionmaking process, technically incompetent courts should 
despise efforts to make themselves balancing artists that are intent on 
ªnding balancing points of environmental protection with competing 
social values.222 The role of the judiciary in resource decisionmaking 
then becomes one of interpreting, rather than designing, judicial en-
forcement powers being used to safeguard state legislative policies— 
adopted by state constitutional provisions—directed toward the protec-
tion of the vast resources within the public trust and thereby setting a 
standard for environmental conservation.223
 Expansion of the public trust doctrine for no other reason than 
to protect the environment simply ignores the economic precedent 
established by the original doctrine itself. Any furtherance of the doc-
trine must be based upon rational thinking and advancing the “com-
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mon good.”224 As this Article has discussed, the most principled ap-
proach to advancing the common good is balancing the legitimate 
economic interests of individual property owners against public re-
source preservation. When this is executed, rarely can it be shown 
that the beneªts of resource preservation outweigh the economic 
concerns of property owners. Thus, any expansion of the doctrine 
should be slow and scrutinized to the highest degree and with a spirit 
of judicial restraint. 
 Regardless of the Constitution’s limited mandate for the public 
trust, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mis-
sissippi has placed the burden of developing the public trust concept 
with the states.225 Nevertheless, Natural Law still plays a valuable con-
structive role to legislators and judges who must implement the doc-
trine. Once again, proper reasoning and principled economic deci-
sionmaking can develop a contemporary public trust concept that is 
aligned with the Constitution’s Natural Law values. However, any ap-
plication that exceeds these principled limits is improper and lacks a 
stable foundation. Thus, the Natural Law advocate should strive to 
keep public servants from wandering outside the conªnes of balanced 
reasoning. 
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